Wittgenstein’s Poker: Contested Constitutionalism and the Limits of Public Meaning Originalism by Bartrum, Ian C.
Washington University Jurisprudence Review
Volume 10 | Issue 1
2017
Wittgenstein’s Poker: Contested Constitutionalism
and the Limits of Public Meaning Originalism
Ian C. Bartrum
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence
Part of the Comparative Philosophy Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts
Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, and the
Law and Politics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington University Jurisprudence Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more
information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ian C. Bartrum, Wittgenstein’s Poker: Contested Constitutionalism and the Limits of Public Meaning Originalism, 10 Wash. U. Jur. Rev.
029 (2017).
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
WITTGENSTEIN’S POKER: CONTESTED 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC MEANING 
ORIGINALISM 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Constitutional originalism is much in the news as our new President 
fills the Supreme Court vacancy Antonin Scalia’s death has created.   
“Public meaning” originalism is probably the most influential version of 
originalism in current theoretical circles.   This essay argues that, while 
these “New Originalists” have thoughtfully escaped some of the 
debilitating criticisms leveled against their predecessors, the result is a 
profoundly impoverished interpretive methodology that has little to offer 
most modern constitutional controversies.  In particular, the fact that our 
constitutional practices are contested—that is, we often do not seek 
semantic or legal agreement—makes particular linguistic indeterminacies 
highly problematic for approaches grounded in historical public meaning.  
Here I highlight two underappreciated sources of such indeterminacy: 
intentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental evolutionary 
vagueness.   Neither of these indeterminacies are susceptible to the New 
Originalist method, and, when added to the well-known problem of 
intentional vagueness, these issues leave public meaning originalism 
incapable of constraining judges in many of our most controversial cases. 
  
 
 
1* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV.  Thanks to Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, 
Peter Bayer, Linda Berger, Brian Bix, Andrew Coan, Saul Cornell, Perry Friedman, Ruben Garcia, 
Anjan Gewali, Jonathan Gienapp, Leslie Griffin, Dan Hamilton, Mike Kagan, Tom McAffee, Steve 
Mailloux, Jay Mootz, Lydia Nussbaum, Robert Post, Frederick Schauer, Jean Sternlight, David 
Tanenhaus, the UNLV Faculty Workshop, and the West Coast Law & Rhetoric Workshop.  With 
apologies to DAVID EDMONDS & JOHN EIDINOW, WITTGENSTEIN’S POKER:  THE STORY OF A TEN-
MINUTE ARGUMENT BETWEEN TWO GREAT PHILOSOPHERS (Harper Collins, 2001).   
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INTRODUCTION 
In March of 2013, Senators Ted Cruz and Dianne Feinstein had a “testy 
exchange” in the Senate Judiciary Committee over a proposal to renew the 
assault weapons ban of 2004.2  Senator Cruz, a Harvard educated lawyer 
and former Supreme Court clerk, seemingly hoped to overwhelm Senator 
Feinstein with a constitutional argument.  He first reminded Feinstein of the 
need to respect our “foundational document” and the framers’ intentions in 
drafting the Bill of Rights.3  He then drew a parallel between the “right of 
the people” announced in the Second Amendment and the same language in 
the First and Fourth Amendments.4  He went on to ask if Feinstein would 
be comfortable if Congress limited free speech by banning particular books, 
or if the courts protected only “specified people” from unreasonable 
searches.  Cruz’s rhetorical assumption, of course, was that Feinstein could 
never approve of such restrictions on speech or privacy. 
 On the surface, Senator Cruz’s efforts were fairly unpersuasive as a 
matter of constitutional argument.  After all, almost no one conceives of 
First or Fourth Amendment protections as absolute. The analogy between 
assault weapons and searches of “specific people” is simply inapt. The ban 
would target particular weapons; thus the appropriate analog is to particular 
searches, not people.  More interestingly, his basic point that the textual 
similarity between the three amendments played upon an intentional 
ambiguity in the original constitutional text.  Akhil Amar, among others, 
noted that “the people” identified in the Second Amendment were actually 
a subset of the larger group contemplated in the First and Fourth.5  The latter 
held what were known as “civil” rights in the 18th century, while the former 
was a smaller group that enjoyed full “political” rights.  Women, for 
example, had the “civil” right to speak, even if they could not exercise the 
“political” rights to vote, serve on juries, or—apropos here—join the militia 
or bear arms.6   It turns out, then, that the term “the people” had ambiguous 
constitutional usages at the time of ratification.  In 2013, this ambiguity 
 
 
2 Jennifer Steinhauer, Panel Votes to Renew Assault Weapons Ban, But Prospects in Full Senate 
Are Dim, N.Y. TIMES A17 (Mar. 15, 2013). Video of the exchange is available on YouTube. 
MichaelSavage4Prez, Ted Cruz & Dianne Feinstein Explosive Debate Over Gun Control In Senate: 'I 
Am Not A 6th Grader', YOUTUBE (Mar. 14, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PWsKJiyesVU.  
3 Jon Healey, Sens. Ted Cruz and Dianne Feinstein Face Off on Gun Control, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
15, 2003) http:// articles.latimes.com/2013/ mar/15/news/la-ol-sens-ted-cruz-and-dianne-feinstein-face-
off-on-gun-control-2013 0315.  
4 Id. 
5E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment as a Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 
2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 892-896 (2001). 
6 Id. 
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allowed Cruz to maintain his originalist pretensions while making a non-
originalist claim regarding the text. 
 Ambiguities of this sort—what I call in this essay “intentional 
contemporary ambiguities”7—present a substantial challenge to “original 
public meaning” accounts of constitutional interpretation. In particular, 
New Originalist theories, which claim that we can “fix” or determine the 
text’s original “communicative content” as an empirical matter,8 seem ill-
equipped to account for circumstances when the drafters intentionally made 
use of ambiguities in existing language conventions to further contested 
political ends.  This difficulty arises, in part, because the New Originalists 
have sworn off “Intentionalism” and now look solely to “original public 
meaning” as the touchstone of constitutional semantics.9  As a result, there 
is no longer any recourse to the drafters’ intentions in resolving the question 
of which “people” held which rights.  The relevant historical language 
conventions, of course, recognized both meanings of the word, and it is 
difficult to see how pragmatic or contextual enrichment (at least based on 
generalized concepts of public meaning) could provide a definitive answer.  
Such a case, then, is evidence that deriving the text’s communicative 
content may require recourse to authorial intent, and thus may demand both 
historical and contemporary construction. 
More importantly, the phenomenon of intentional contemporary 
ambiguity helps to illustrate the particular kinds of interpretive problems 
that can arise within a contested language practice.  Even under the best of 
conditions there are real problems with the notion that communicative 
content might be empirically fixed and transported through time into  
different language practices10  This is because the semantic meaning of 
 
 
7 An indeterminacy may be either (1) contemporary or evolutionary; and it may be either (2) 
intentional or incidental.  The first distinction addresses whether constitutional text is indeterminate 
when ratified, or becomes indeterminate as practices evolve.  The second recognizes that indeterminacies 
may be intentional or unintentional. Contentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental vagueness 
demonstrate the indeterminacy of New Originalism.  
8 Per the New Originalists, constitutional explication takes place in two distinct phases: (1) 
Interpretation—in which we discover the text’s “communicative content”; and (2) Construction—in 
which we construe the text’s “legal meaning” in the context of some modern controversy.  The first 
phase seeks to “fix” the text’s “original public meaning” at the moment of ratification.  We then carry 
this meaning into the construction phase, where it constrains our conclusions about the text’s legal 
content, absent weighty countervailing reasons.  See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2011). 
9 Lawrence B. Solum, THE FIXATION THESIS: THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL FACT IN ORIGINAL 
MEANING, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26-27 (2015).  Of course, not all originalists have abandoned 
intentionalism—which at least seems to ask the right questions about linguistic meaning.   See Larry 
Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORD. L. REV. 539 (2013) (arguing that interpretation 
is about trying to discover authorial intent). 
10 E.g., Ian Bartrum, Two Dogmas of Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 157,  172-75 (2015). 
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language transposed into an alien communicative culture can arise only out 
of analysis, construction, and contextualization—or, as this process is often 
called in other contexts, translation.  All of the constructive difficulties 
present in ideal translative endeavors—those where all of the stakeholders 
want to agree on a meaning, without preconceptions about what that 
meaning should be—are multiplied many times when the parties do not seek 
agreement, but rather hope to maximize their own argumentative 
advantages.    
The fact that our constitutional practice involves this sort of contested 
translation has at least three entailments for interpretation.  First, because 
the relationship between historical text and modern semantics is practical 
and constructive in nature, it may require an inquiry into intentions, and thus 
it may not be a matter of “empirical” discovery.  Second, the problem of 
contemporary ambiguity demonstrates that this sort of linguistic uncertainty 
is not limited to cases of vagueness; and, indeed, public meaning accounts 
may not have the resources to address intentional contemporary 
ambiguities.11  Third, once these types of contested indeterminacies have 
slipped their nose into the semantic tent, we must reconcile ourselves to the 
full, rich spectrum of practical linguistic complexity that may arise in 
nontrivial cases of constitutional contestation.  Or, as Karl Llewellyn 
famously observed of the common law, “Every single precedent, according 
to what may be the attitude of future judges, is ambiguous.”12  If this is true, 
then both the text’s communicative and legal content are necessarily the 
product of an ongoing constructive argument.  This need not, however, 
arouse deep anxieties about unfettered judicial activism.  Indeed, it is the 
adversarial contest itself—not some idealized interpretive orthodoxy or 
posited “law of interpretation”—that most effectively constrains 
constitutional judges. We should thus embrace our differences in all of their 
vigor, nuance, and uncertainty.13  As James Madison observed long ago, a 
zealous diversity of opinions and interests better safeguards our democratic 
institutions and liberties than mere “parchment barriers” ever could.14 
 
 
11 Larry Solum has at least recognized this possibility, but has not—to my knowledge—attempted 
to resolve it definitively.  See Id. at 102 (characterizing this as a problem of “irreducible ambiguity”); 
accord Id. at 107, n. 25 (“My view is that ambiguities can usually be resolved by interpretation [on the 
basis of the context of the utterance], although it is at least theoretically possible that some ambiguities 
cannot be so resolved.”). 
12
 K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 71 (1951). 
13 But see William Baude & Stephen Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 
(2017); William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).   
14 THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 48 (James Madison) 38, 333 (Jacob E. Cooke, ed., 1961).  The famous 
phrase “mere ‘parchment barriers’” here underscores the relative weakness of textual, as opposed to 
structural, constraints on institutional power. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This essay argues that the entailments of understanding constitutional 
language as a contested practice substantially undermine the quest for 
judicial constraints grounded in empirical original public meanings.  Again, 
the search for historical meaning (or communicative content) is difficult 
enough when the relevant speakers and all of the interpretive stakeholders 
are actually trying, in good faith, to come to a semantic agreement.15  Those 
empirical difficulties become exponentially more acute—sometimes 
irresolvable—when both speakers and stakeholders actively exploit 
communicative doubt or indeterminacy in order to further contested ends.16  
This argument leans heavily on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, 
which is enigmatic and controverted in its own right—so much so that there 
is some disagreement about whether he can teach us anything useful about 
legal interpretation.17  I remain convinced, however, that a reasonably 
straightforward application of Wittgenstein’s most fundamental and least 
controversial ideas offers important insights into the limits of a written 
constitution as source of determinate or objective semantic meanings.  I 
argue that in our contested constitutional context two underappreciated 
types of indeterminacy—intentional contemporary ambiguity and 
incidental evolutionary vagueness—present substantial problems for 
original public meaning as a source of empirical interpretive constraint.   
When added to the problem of intentional vagueness—which the New 
Originalists already largely concede to modern construction—these 
indeterminacies impose significant limitations on the practical normativity 
of public meaning originalism.18   
 
 
15 Much of Wittgenstein’s work on language is an effort to show how the remarkable feat of 
semantic agreement is possible even among contemporaneous speakers.  Brian H. Bix, Legal 
Interpretation and the Philosophy of Language, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 
145, 147 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan, eds. 2012). 
16 This point is perhaps analogous to that which Scott Shapiro makes in discussing disagreements 
in conceptual analysis of the nature of “law.”  See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 17 (Harvard Belknap, 
2011).  When ambiguities in reference confound our analytic efforts, Shapiro reasons, a conflict may be 
irresolvable: “If so, conceptual analysis of law would not be possible because there would be no object 
to which we are all referring when we use the word “law.”  Id. 
17 See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Dworkin’s Fallacy, Or What the Philosophy of Language Can’t 
Teach Us About the Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1897 (2003); see also Stefano Bertea, Remarks on a Legal 
Positivist Misuse of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, 22 LAW & PHIL. 513 (2003). 
18 It is true that much of the Constitution is reasonably determinate and infrequently uncontested.  
That is so, I suggest, because most—if not all—of the accepted forms of constitutional interpretation 
converge on a stable and shared meaning of that text.   Public meaning originalism, of course, may 
provide some practical normativity in such “easy cases,” but so do most other methodologies.  What I 
claim here is that public meaning originalism can rarely provide definitive normative grounds for 
deciding between divergent interpretive approaches in a robust constitutional contest. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
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I. LANGUAGE AS A GAME 
 Perhaps Wittgenstein’s most famous claim is that speaking a language 
is like playing a game.19  Indeed, as a German speaker, he happily captured 
the idea in a word mash-up—“Sprachspiel”—or, in English, “language 
game.”20  He hoped this would “bring into prominence the fact that the 
speaking of a language is part of an activity, or a form of life.”21  Or, to put 
it another way, language is something we do, not something that we have.22  
Further, like a game, language is a rule-governed activity; which is to say 
that it is rules, not instruments (e.g. pieces or balls) that give a particular 
action or utterance a particular “meaning.”23  While this point may seem 
fairly obvious in the context of a chess match or football game, Wittgenstein 
observed that philosophers (including himself) had often confused these 
ideas when analyzing language.24  They mistakenly assumed that words, not 
rules, produce linguistic meanings.25  He hoped that the game comparison 
would remove this confusion, so that we might more clearly see that 
“[w]ords and chess pieces are analogous; knowing how to use a word is like 
knowing how to move a chess piece. … [Thus the] meaning of a word is to 
be defined by the rules for its use.”26 
 The importance of this insight may seem a bit obscure until we reflect 
upon the entailments of the classical idea that words “represent” objects in 
the world, and that it is these associated objects that define a word’s 
meaning.27  While this may be roughly true of some words used for some 
purposes—perhaps some nouns and names—it is certainly not true of all, or 
even most, words.28   With this mistaken “representationalist” premise in 
mind, however, it is easy to see why many people have believed we could 
determine a word’s meaning by discovering “facts” about what it signifies 
 
 
19 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §23 (Blackwell German-English ed., 
2007) [hereinafter INVESTIGATIONS]. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Indeed, Philip Bobbitt has made precisely the same claim about “law.”  PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (Blackwell, 1991). 
23 WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES: CAMBRIDGE, 1932-1935 Pt. I, § 2 (Alice Ambrose, ed., 1972) 
[hereinafter LECTURES]. 
24 INVESTIGATIONS, §§ 1-3.  
25 Id. 
26 LECTURES, PT. I, § 2. 
27 INVESTIGATIONS, §§ 1-3.  Wittgenstein’s own such account—set out in his earlier Tractatus-
Logico Philosophicus—claimed that words represented “simples”, and that sentences depicted some 
arrangement or relationship between these basic elements. 
28 Id. § 1. Even the meaning of these sorts of words does not depend upon a relationship to 
something in the world—we can understand the meaning of “dragon” even if none exist; and “Napoleon 
Bonaparte” still has meaning long after the man’s death. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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in the world.  Indeed, Wittgenstein suggested that this sort of confusion 
about a word’s “empirical” or “foundational” meaning has given rise to 
many, if not all, of the great philosophical questions.29 For example, Plato 
notwithstanding, the word “justice” lacks foundational meaning; it is just a 
piece used according to the rules of various language games.30  Essentially, 
for Wittgenstein, such puzzles actually reduce to confusions about language 
usage, or as he famously put it: “Philosophical problems arise when 
language goes on holiday.”31   
 An analogy to card games may help to illustrate these basic ideas.  It is 
easy to see that the cards in a standard American deck have no meaning in 
and of themselves.  Like a chess piece, a card’s meaning derives from the 
various uses to which a player may put it according to the rules of a given 
game.  Unlike chess pieces, however, the cards have different meanings 
across a wide variety of games—and this in turn makes cards more readily 
analogous to words and language games.32 Still, the card analogy does not 
quite capture all the complexity of language, because the rules of language 
games generally evolve more quickly than do the rules of card games.  That 
is, the rules of language games—and thus the meaning of words—are 
always changing as our forms of life change, and so the competent player 
must play along alertly in order to remain fluent.  One might imagine, as an 
illustration, a hermit who shut himself away in 1980 and spoke to no one 
until 2017.  Many words would now have uses (and thus meanings) that he 
would not understand. “Text,” for example, has evolved into a verb. 
 The card analogy also makes it clear why the cards themselves have no 
foundational meaning:  It is because there is nothing in the world which the 
ten of Spades (for example) represents, which could allow us to identify its 
meaning as a matter of empirical “fact.”  Thus, contemplating a card’s 
foundational meaning is as nonsensical and futile as were ancient efforts to 
define “the Good” once and for all.   To understand the meaning of the ten 
of Spades, it turns out, is simply to have the practical ability to play that 
card appropriately within a particular game at a particular time and place.33  
 
 
29 See Robert Fogelin, “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Philosophy,” THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
WITTGENSTEIN 34, 37-48 (Hans Sluga & David G. Stern, eds., 1996). 
30 See, PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, BK I (327 A—353 D) in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO (W.H.D. 
Rouse, trans. 1956) (exploring meaning of word “justice”).  This, of course, does not entail that “justice” 
has no meaning; simply that its meaning is a product of particularized and contextual rule following, 
and not a reference to some immutable form. 
31 Id. § 38; see also Fogelin, supra note 29. 
32 One could, of course, imagine new games played with chess pieces in which the pieces take on 
new meanings.  
33 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY §§ 61-62 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright 
eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) [hereinafter ON CERTAINTY]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
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While we might argue that the rules of a game ought to be otherwise than 
they are—and our efforts may even succeed in modifying future games—it 
is idle to claim that a play recognized as appropriate in an existing game is 
invalid based upon some empirical truth about what the card refers to in the 
world.34  Again, the card does not refer to anything empirically verifiable—
and so there is, as some would have it, no there, there.35  What the card does 
do is ask us to follow certain rules with set criteria in order to participate in 
a shared social practice.   
This of course means that any inquiry into meaning must focus not on 
the cards, but on the rules.  Here, again, it is important to recognize that 
most card games (or languages) do not rely on a “rulebook” to establish 
foundational principles or meanings.36  The rules are simply a matter of 
lived practice, passed on from one person to another one game at a time—
which is why, as Wittgenstein pointed out, “it has no meaning to say that a 
game has always been played wrong.”37  It is true that there are often broad 
convergences in those practices, so that two people who have never met 
might successfully play a game of Gin.38  But it is also true that there may 
be variations in the ways that each of these people has learned to play the 
game—“We play it this way at home”—that may leave gaps in the shared 
practice.  In such cases, the players will simply have to work out these 
inconsistencies as they go along, setting precedents for future play as they 
move forward.  In Wittgenstein’s words, “Not only rules, but examples are 
needed for establishing a practice.  Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the 
practice has to speak for itself.”39  This is why Gin—but even more acutely 
language—is something we do, and keep doing in ever-evolving ways, and 
not something that we have in a foundational sense. 
 
 
34 See, e.g., Id. § 496. 
35 But see Randy Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORD. L. REV. 411, 416 
(“[W]hen confronting conflicting interpretive claims about meaning there is (à la Gertrude Stein) a there 
there potentially to resolve the conflict.”).  Again, the point is not that a card (or word) cannot have a 
determinate meaning—and in this sense refer to a “there”—but rather that we must establish this 
meaning practically—thus contingently—and not empirically. 
36 One might be tempted here to point to dictionaries or books that provide instruction on how to 
play various card games.  Upon closer examination, however, it becomes clear that these sorts of books 
are ex post descriptions of the way that a particular game was played at a particular time or place.  They 
do not, in themselves, constitute the rules of play, nor do they establish how the game will be played in 
the future.  To draw an analogy to the legal world, such sources are something like the Restatements of 
the common law. 
37 ON CERTAINTY, supra note 33, at § 496. 
38 It was, in fact, largely for the existence of these broad convergences—yielding fairly determinate 
meanings—that Wittgenstein hoped to account.  Brian H. Bix, Legal Interpretation and the Philosophy 
of Language, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 147 (Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M 
Tiersma, eds. 2012).   
39 ON CERTAINTY, supra note 33, at § 139. 
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Public meaning originalists seem to suggest that we might take a kind 
of snapshot of a language game at a particular moment in time, discover the 
rules that governed play at that moment, and then treat those abstracted rules 
as something like “facts” that can define practical meanings—at least for an 
instant in time.40   This view accepts, in other words, that words get their 
meaning from rules, not objects, but then claims that we can treat these rules 
as though they were objects that we might discover and study empirically.41  
In this way, we might try to play a language game “as it was played” at some 
discrete historical moment.  The card game analogy reveals, however, that 
this approach simply replicates the representationalist fallacy at a higher 
level of abstraction.  Rules are decidedly not facts, not just because they are 
not objects, but because rules exist as interdependent parts of a lived 
practice—a form of life—in which they are embedded:  To repeat a theme, 
rules (both linguistic and legal) are something we do, not something we 
have.  In the case of language, it makes no sense to “play a game as it was 
played” when the worldly circumstances that gave rise to its particular 
interlocking rule structures have disappeared, so that no one plays it that 
way anymore.42  To do so is actually to play a wholly new language game, 
which may or may not have practical value inasmuch as it serves a new form 
of life with different communicative purposes.43 
To illustrate the point, imagine that someone has done an empirical 
study of all the rules of all the variations of Gin played between 1820 and 
1830.  Based on this research, she is able to conclude that a player could 
generally use the ten of Spades as a wild card in certain sets or runs.  Now 
fast forward to 1940, and assume that the rules of Gin have evolved so that 
wild cards are no longer an accepted part of the game—in fact, the very 
concept of a “wild card” is widely condemned as part of a watered down 
and regrettable period in Gin’s history.  Now, not only has the ten of Spades 
lost some of the meaning it had in 1825, but the “wild” aspect of the older 
 
 
40 Thus, Larry Solum has argued: “[W]hen we disagree about [semantic content] we are disagreeing 
about linguistic facts.  In principle, there is a fact of the matter about what the linguistic content is.”  
Lawrence Solum, A Reader’s Guide To Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin 13 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130665.   This also seems to be the import of the “corpus 
linguistics” movement in constitutional theory.  See Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help 
Make Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE. L. J. FORUM 57 (2016). 
41 See, e.g., Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 35, at 415-17.   
42 For an exceptionally insightful historian’s take on this issue, lamenting the lack of “holism” and 
“historicism” in New Originalist efforts at historical translation, see Jonathan Gienapp, Historicism and 
Holism: Failures of Originalist Translation, 84 FORD. L. REV. 935, 941-44 (2015). 
43 For those constitutional theorists who make this sort of claim, it seems the larger hope is that our 
current legal practices (or games) might be constrained in ways that they now are not.  See, e.g., Solum, 
supra note 9.  This would presumably serve our current form of life by reining in activist judges of a 
particular sort.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
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ten of Spades no longer fits within the game’s broader norms.   Thus, not 
only has playing the card this way become meaningless or “nonsense,” but 
any attempt to do so in 1940 would reveal a player’s passé understanding of 
Gin.44  This is what Wittgenstein means when he says language games are 
part of a particular form of life.45  Indeed, in some ways the attempt to play 
the old ten of Spades in the new game is something like trying to use the 
Newtonian terms “mass” and “force” to solve a problem posed in 
Einsteinian physics.46   
All this sort of empirical study can show, then, is that given the 
particular circumstances of a particular world at a particular time, most 
people played Gin in a particular way.  And, in the case of a language game, 
it is the particular cultural circumstances of that moment—the practical 
communicative problems that the game arose to solve—which produced the 
historical rules and meanings.  When that cultural or circumstantial 
paradigm ceased to exist, so did the practice that gave it meaning.  At most, 
we might achieve a kind of translation between older and newer forms of 
life—so long as we recognize two fundamental points: (1) Translation is 
always a constructive activity; and (2) as with Newtonian and Einsteinian 
physics, some important ideas simply will not translate.47 
To put this critically important point in more expressly Wittgensteinian 
terms, a given term—“commerce,” for example—bears only a “family 
 
 
44 Brian Bix hints at this point in discussing Wittgenstein’s earlier efforts to analyze problems of 
linguistic “verification”: “Conventional meanings assume usual circumstances.”  Brian H. Bix, Legal 
Interpretation and the Philosophy of Language, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 
150 (Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds. 2012).  When circumstances change, in other words, 
so do meanings. 
45 INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, § 23. 
46 Thomas Kuhn has famously pointed out that such an effort is meaningless because the 
Newtonian and Einsteinian physical paradigms are incommensurable.  Thomas S. Kuhn, Rationality and 
Theory Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 563, 566 (1983).  Or, as Michael Polanyi has put it, scientists in different 
schools “think differently, speak a different language, live in a different world.”  MICHAEL POLANYI, 
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE: TOWARDS A POST-CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 151 (1958).  The same 
incommensurability exists, as Wittgenstein pointed out, across different language games—including 
language games played at different times as part of different “forms of life.”  This is what he means 
when he says, “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.” INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, at 
223.   
47 Again, Jonathan Gienapp has insightfully identified several failures with the New Originalists’ 
“empirical” approach to such translation.  Gienapp, supra note 42, at 940-44.  Perhaps closer to the mark 
is Larry Lessig’s approach.  Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). In 
the constitutional context, Christina Mulligan and her co-authors have shown just how difficult this 
process may be across different languages, even at the same historical moment.  Christina Mulligan, 
Michael Douma, Hans Lind, & Brian Quinn, Founding Era Translations of the Constitution, 31 CONST. 
COMMENT. 1 (2016).  Indeed, Mulligan points to the nearly unanimous scholarly opinion that, 
“Translation entails, and has always entailed, a process of analysis.  Although this claim is intuitive, 
establishing it is not trivial.  The competing possibility—that translation is some rote process, where 
word A in the source language becomes word A’ in the in the target—come readily to mind.”  Id. at 11. 
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resemblance” to itself across different historical language games.48  Thus, 
the word “commerce” is used today for many—but not all—of the same 
purposes that it was in 1789.   Our changing forms of life have attached new 
meanings to the term, and other meanings have fallen away.49  Wittgenstein 
likened a word’s uses across different language games to the individual 
fibers that make up a piece of spun thread: Each fiber makes up an essential 
part of the thread, but none spans its whole length.50  Put another way, each 
use is necessary, but not sufficient, to establish a complete account of the 
word’s meaning.  This means that “commerce” occupies different space 
within the complex, evolving web of language rules that serve our modern 
form of life than it did in older language games.51  The effort to transpose 
an old term into our new practice thus requires choices about which 
meanings to emphasize or cast aside—we must reshape 1789’s “commerce” 
to make it fit into our modern jigsaw puzzle—and these choices are, of 
course, culturally normative and constructive in nature.  As a result, 
establishing even the communicative content of historical language within 
a changed form of life is always a constructive, and not just an empirical, 
endeavor. 
These insights give rise to a number of difficult questions for 
constitutional interpreters, especially those who seek determinate meanings 
that might closely cabin judicial decision-making.  Such individuals might 
ask whether our games might at some point evolve so much that we can no 
longer properly say we are playing “Gin”—or that we are still doing 
“American constitutionalism.”  To assess this sort of question, we must 
remember the fundamental insight already underfoot—neither the terms 
“Gin” nor “American constitutionalism” refer to objects in the world that 
 
 
48 INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, §§ 66-67.  See also, Sean Wilson, The Fallacy of Originalism: 
What Philosophy of Language and Law Says About ‘Original Meanings’, 14-15 Working Paper 
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1405451.  
49 Some years ago, Rick Hills put the point quite nicely in a post on Prawfsblawg: 
Constitutional terms like "the rights ... retained by the people" refer not to some trans-
historical nugget of meaning, some referent like the Potomac River to which "the Potomac[k] 
River” referred in 1791 and still refers today. Instead, such terms are ideologically loaded 
markers referring to what Wittgenstein would call a "form of life"—a vast array of values, 
beliefs, and points of salience that have often vanished long ago.  Assuming that some judge 
with the powers of Quentin Skinner actually succeeded in reconstructing this array of beliefs, 
she would never enforce it, because it would be too unpalatable to the modern society that, 
in the long run, chooses the judges. 
 
Rick Hills, How Kurt Lash Cured Me of Originalism, PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 6, 2009), 
http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341c6a7953ef0120a54f9880970b. 
50 Id. at § 67.  
51 Id. 
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we might use to verify their meanings.  Instead, both terms identify their 
own rule-governed social practices, and so the only way to answer our 
question is to look at whether practitioners generally treat our evolving 
actions or utterances as recognizable parts of their respective practices.  If 
so, we are still using the terms appropriately, even if the games have 
changed in important ways. 
Perhaps the most common kind of confusion on this point arises when 
critics point to the American Constitution as the sort of foundational object 
that can verify or falsify contested meanings within our practice of 
constitutionalism.  The claim here is that “the American Constitution” is a 
proper noun, thus there is an object to which the term refers, and so our 
“constitutionalism” must be bound to that reference point in some verifiable 
way.52  Such a claim is certainly relevant if we are trying to distinguish the 
American Constitution from some other document or object, but that is 
rarely the communicative problem that people who make this argument are 
trying to solve.  Rather, they hope to use the Constitution’s words as a 
foundational and limiting source of constitutional meaning.  But again, 
many words do not refer to objects that can provide the sort of foundation 
or limits these critics seek.  As a result, the Constitution’s text cannot speak 
for itself: its meaning arises only as a product of a shared, rule-bound 
communicative practice.53  While it is certainly true that the text may limit 
constitutional meaning, it does so not by reference to objects or as a matter 
of “fact,” but rather because we impose those limits as part of a shared 
interpretive practice.54  Once more (for good measure) the Constitution is 
 
 
52 I take this to be the essence of those theories that rely in significant ways on the Constitution’s 
“writteness.”  See Andrew Coan, The Irrelevance of Writteness in Constitutional Interpretation, 128 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1025 (2010) (canvassing theories). 
53 In Philip Bobbitt’s words, “Texts may speak, but they don’t decide.” Philip Bobbitt, The 
Constitutional Canon, in LEGAL CANONS 331 (Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson, eds. 2000).  Or, in 
Mitch Berman and Kevin Toh’s formulation, “[T]ext is not itself law.” Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin 
Toh, On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORD. L. REV. 545, 
570 n. 82 (2013); accord Mitchell N. Berman, Book Review, Judge Posner’s Simple Law, 113 MICH. 
L. REV. 777, 804 n. 113 (2015) (“Text is not law, for they are different sorts of things.  A text is an 
assemblage of signs and symbols; a law is a normative entity.”). 
54 I was once posed something like the following hypothetical:  Imagine the Constitution provides 
that the Presidential inauguration ceremony must be held outside if the temperature is “at or above 40 
degrees.”   It is well known that the founding generation used Fahrenheit’s temperature scale, but in the 
intervening years the United States has switched over to the Centigrade system.  As a result, based on 
contemporary language conventions, the “Temperature Clause” now seems to require an outdoor 
ceremony in extreme heat (at least 104 degrees Fahrenheit).  Surely, my interlocutor suggested, this 
problem demonstrates that we must adopt historical language conventions to make sense of the 
constitutional text.  My answer (though clumsy at the time) was that we would very likely translate the 
historical meaning into modern terms with something like “5 degrees Centigrade,” but that this would 
be a matter of our shared interpretive practices—contemporary constitutional contestation and 
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something we do, not something we have. 
We might call this practice of constructing both semantic and legal 
meaning “constitutionalism,” and I suggest that it is this practice we are 
most often referring to when we talk about “the Constitution.”55  To say, in 
other words, that, “The Constitution does not permit ϕ” is really to say 
something like, “Our practice of constitutionalism does not recognize ϕ as 
legitimate.”  Consider, for example, Jack Balkin’s observation that, 
“[o]riginalism is mostly unknown outside of the United States.”56  Unknown 
even to our northern neighbors, so that even if Canadians had our 
constitutional text as their written charter, their practical constitutionalism 
would undoubtedly produce different meanings than those we know.57   
Again, it is the practice, not just the text, which bestows constitutional 
meanings.   
In the remainder of this essay, I will argue that the American practice 
is one of contested constitutionalism, which is to say that in our 
constitutional language game meanings often arise out of a contest.  That is, 
both the semantic and legal content of at least some significant 
constitutional language are the product of a contest involving competing 
assertions, arguments, and decisions.  Wittgenstein teaches us that this 
contest, like any language game, is rule-governed—some assertions and 
arguments are legitimate and some are not—and these rules arise out of the 
practical problems that shape our current constitutional forms of life.   A 
fundamental feature of this contest is the role that judicial decisions play in 
settling particular disputes—at least temporarily—thus filling in gaps in 
meaning that arise out of our changing forms of life.  These decisions then 
serve as something like the loophole-filling “examples” Wittgenstein 
described in our language practices.58  Most importantly, the fact that our 
constitutional language game often takes the form of a contest undermines 
the relative semantic determinacy that the text can produce, particularly in 
 
 
construction—and there is nothing about the text itself which “represents” a particular temperature.  
Indeed, although it seems unlikely, there is nothing illegitimate about reading the Clause to reference 40 
degrees Centigrade, so long as that is the meaning that our practical interpretive contestation settles 
upon.  In any case, this is an (likely uncontroversial) example of the sort of “evolutionary ambiguity” 
discussed in Part II. A below. 
55 This might be something similar to the “disciplining rules” that Owen Fiss sees constraining 
legal interpretation.  Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 744 (1982). 
56 Jack Balkin, “Why Are Americans Originalist?” in LAW, SOCIETY AND COMMUNITY: SOCIO-
LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROGER COTTERRELL, (David Schiff & Richard Nobles, eds. 2015). 
57 On Canada’s interpretive practices, see Peter Hogg, “Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme 
Court” in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 55, 83 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ed. 
2006).  On “living tree” constitutionalism, see Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada [1930] A.C. 
124, 9. 
58 See note 22, supra and accompanying discussion. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
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controverted cases.  Knowing constitutional text, history, and even doctrine 
is therefore insufficient to understand American constitutionalism without 
understanding the current rules of the interpretive contest. 
Philip Bobbitt’s remarkable efforts to identify and describe these rules 
provide a very valuable—if perhaps not entirely complete—picture of the 
“grammar” of our constitutionalism.59  He has described a practice 
composed of six distinct modalities of constitutional argument: textual, 
historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and ethical.60  While these 
modalities coexist as parts of the same larger practice, they remain 
incommensurable in important respects—like Newtonian and Einsteinian 
physics61—which is one important reason that our constitutionalism takes 
the shape of an argumentative contest.62  This much Bobbitt has 
demonstrated beyond much reasonable debate—even if there is still much 
left to understand about how or why we choose one contested meaning over 
another in particular cases.63  The next section, however, explores a different 
set of questions.  It uses comparisons to poker games to illustrate the 
problems of indeterminacy that persist even within those modalities of 
constitutional argument that adhere most closely to the constitutional text.  
In other words, even if our constitutional practice were to evolve to 
recognize only textual or historical arguments, constitutional meaning 
would still be contested and indeterminate in a substantial number of cases. 
II. CONTESTS OF AMBIGUITY AND VAGUENESS 
While the accepted modalities of American constitutionalism are 
undoubtedly a product of complex and ever-evolving social rule-following 
practices, it seems likely that these interpretive practices generally reflect 
some larger body of constitutional values near the center of our political 
imaginations.64  Certainly among those values is a strong desire that the 
 
 
59 E.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (Basil Blackwell, 1991); on 
“grammar” see SEAN WILSON, THE FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION 14-15 (2014). 
60 BOBBITT, supra note 59, at 12-13. 
61 The Newtonian terms ‘force’ and ‘mass’ provide the simplest sort of example.  One cannot learn 
how to use either one without simultaneously learning how to use the other.  Nor can this part of the 
language-acquisition process go forward with resort to Newton’s Second Law of Motion.  Only with its 
aid can one learn to how to pick out Newtonian forces and masses, how to attach the corresponding 
terms to nature.” Kuhn, Rationality and Theory Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 563, 563 (1983); see also supra note 
44. 
62 BOBBITT, supra note 59, at 12-13. Bobbitt has further suggested that it is the existence of this 
contest that justifies the institution of judicial review.  If constitutional meanings were determinate, we 
would hardly need a trained judiciary to interpret the document.   
63  See e.g., Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV 259 (2012). 
64 I have made this argument in more detail elsewhere.  See Id. 
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Constitution have determinate and discoverable meanings—meanings that 
impose clear substantive limits on the government’s structure and 
authority.65  To this end, there are those who would like to narrow the 
acceptable range of our constitutional argumentative practices with the hope 
of reducing the number or kind of our interpretive disagreements.66   Indeed, 
a particularly strong version of this claim might suggest that our practices 
should evolve so as to treat prudential, ethical, structural, and doctrinal 
arguments as presumptively illegitimate interpretive modalities.  This 
would mean that only textual and historical assertions could legitimately 
inform the judicial decisions that fill in emergent gaps in our sense of 
constitutional meaning.  Even if such a drastic (and wildly imprudent) 
change in our practice were to occur, however, constitutional meaning 
would remain at least partially indeterminate and contested, our contests 
would simply change their form or grammar.  The chimera of the Umpire 
Judge as bound conduit of constitutional truth would still run up short 
against the inevitability of contested textual ambiguity and vagueness.67
 Ambiguity occurs when the rules of a language game allow us to use 
the same term in at least two different ways—for example, a “right” answer 
 
 
65 Associate Justice Antonin Scalia was perhaps the most prominent advocate (at least rhetorically) 
of this sort of view, often telling audiences that the Constitution’s text is “dead, dead, dead.”  E.g., Tasha 
Tsiaperas, “Constitution a ‘dead, dead, dead’ document, Scalia tells SMU audience,” DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS (January 28, 2013) http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/park-
cities/headlines/20130128-supreme-court-justice-scalia-offers-perspective-on-the-law-at-smu-
lecture.ece  
66 Id. 
67 To be clear, this is not to surrender the constructive field entirely to the sorts of subjectivism that 
characterized the realist or critical legal studies movements of the last century. See, e.g., Karl N. 
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes 
are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950) (deconstructing statutory interpretation); and THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys, ed. 1982) (anthologizing critical legal 
studies scholarship). I recognize that the originalist revival of the 1980s was in many ways a direct 
response to the profound anxieties those movements aroused, e.g. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402-6 (1977); ROBERT H. 
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 15-18 (1990), but it has 
largely been a failed response.  In part for the reasons discussed herein, originalism simply cannot 
provide the broad sorts of empirical constraints that its early proponents sought.  Much more promising 
in this regard is the contemporaneous work of people like Philip Bobbitt, Stanley Fish, and Owen Fiss, 
which describes and analyzes the internal, practical constraints that arise out of our efforts to construct 
constitutional meanings. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) (suggesting that interpretive 
practices constitute their own norms); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (Harvard, 1980) 
(arguing that meaning arises from the practices of “interpretive communities”); Owen M. Fiss, 
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) (arguing that interpretive communities 
generate “disciplining rules” for practitioners). My own views fall somewhere on the spectrum of these 
latter scholars—with perhaps more emphasis on the role that adversarial interpretive contestation 
plays—but those claims are not this essay’s principal concern. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
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or a “right” hand.68  Vagueness occurs when the language rules are 
themselves underdetermined, so that there is uncertainty about whether it is 
correct to use a particular term in a particular way—for example, we might 
wonder whether or when it is appropriate to say that a friend is driving 
“dangerously.”69  There are undoubtedly a lot of ways to think about 
problems of legal indeterminacy,70 but, for contested constitutional 
purposes, this essay draws two fundamental distinctions:  An indeterminacy 
may be either (1) contemporary or evolutionary; and it may be either (2) 
intentional or incidental.71  The first distinction suggests that constitutional 
 
 
68 See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Vagueness and Ambiguity in Legal Interpretation, in VAGUENESS 
IN NORMATIVE TEXTS 73, 79 (Vijay K. Bhatia, ed. 2005).  The standard example compares a commercial 
“bank” with a river “bank.”  Id. 
69 See, e.g., H. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS, 177 (Harvard, 1989). 
70 See, e.g., TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW (Oxford, 2000) (describing 
multidimensional indeterminacy inherent in “extravagantly” vague terms like “reasonable”); Ralf 
Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE 
AND LAW (Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds. 2012) (describing logical, ontological, 
epistemological, and semantic approaches to vagueness); Scott Soames, Vagueness and the Law, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (Andrei Marmor, ed. 2012) (positing “partial 
definition theories” and “epistemic theories” of vagueness);  Andrei Marmor, Varieties of Vagueness in 
the Law,  University of Southern California Legal Research Paper Series No. 12-8, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com /sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2039076 (differentiating “transparent” and 
“extravagant” vagueness);  Hrafn Asgeirsson, On the Instrumental Value of Vagueness in the Law, 125 
ETHICS 425 (2015) (exploring problem of incommensurate multi-dimensionality) Brian H. Bix, Legal 
Interpretation and the Philosophy of Language, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 
(Lawrence M. Solan & Peter M Tiersma, eds. 2012) (canvassing literature on indeterminacy and “open-
textured” language); Brian H. Bix, “Vagueness and Political Choice in Law,” in VAGUENESS AND THE 
LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher, eds. Oxford Univ. Press 
2016) (forthcoming, on file with author); Roy Sorensen, Vagueness Has No Function In Law, 7 LEGAL 
THEORY 387 (2001). 
Much of this scholarship has begun pulling from the philosophical end of the thread, using the 
specific case of legal interpretation to better understand general linguistic principles.  Thus, some 
theorists have debated the lessons that legal usages may have for existing philosophical accounts of 
vagueness.  Scott Soames, for example, has argued that the controversial “epistemic” theory of 
vagueness (the precise borders of vague reference exist, but are not knowable) has very limited utility, 
at least in legal practice.  Andrei Marmor has explored the distinct sorts of problems that “ordinary,” 
“transparent,” and “extravagant” vagueness pose within the legal context.  More law-oriented theorists 
have begun to explore the sorts of instrumental values and purposes that linguistic indeterminacy may 
serve in particular legal settings. Thus, folks like Timothy Endicott and Hrafn Asgeirsson have suggested 
that vague language has certain instrumental value in statutory drafting: for example, it helps to avoid 
certain types of arbitrariness and has a power-allocating function in certain kinds of controversies.  Brian 
Bix has suggested that statute or contract drafters may utilize indeterminate language to avoid the costs 
associated with resolving disagreements up front, possibly with the hope that those indeterminacies do 
not produce actual future disputes.  Others, like Roy Sorensen, have argued that vagueness serves no 
purpose at all in law, and we should thus work to avoid it whenever possible.  My goal here is to begin 
a discussion about the ways that textual indeterminacies both ensure and inform enduring constitutional 
contests. 
71 The concept of an “incidental” indeterminacy may be similar to the more standard classification 
of a “latent” ambiguity—where a text appears clear, but some extrinsic evidence renders the reference 
uncertain.  See, e.g., Gideon Rosen, Textualism, Intentionalism, and the Law of Contract, in 
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text may be indeterminate at the moment it is ratified, or that it may become 
indeterminate as our language practices evolve.  The second recognizes that 
such indeterminacies may be intentional, or they may be unavoidable or 
unanticipated incidents of constitutional drafting and contested language.  I 
am principally concerned in what follows with two particular types of 
indeterminacy: intentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental 
vagueness.  The former is a species of indeterminacy that New Originalism 
largely ignores or brackets,72 while the latter does not seem susceptible to 
empirical historical inquiry. 
A. Evolutionary and Contemporary Ambiguities 
Evolutionary ambiguities are generally the easiest to identify and 
resolve.  The word “text” offers a modern illustration.  For many years, 
“text” was primarily used to discuss written words.  With the invention and 
rapid ubiquity of cell phones, however, “text” is probably more often used 
now to describe words sent electronically across a cellular data network.  
Thus, as our forms of life have evolved, an assertion that would likely not 
have been ambiguous twenty years ago certainly might be now.  Perhaps 
the most commonly cited example of an evolutionary ambiguity in 
constitutional language is Article IV’s promise of federal protection against 
“domestic violence.”73  At the time it was ratified, this language referred 
unambiguously to intrastate hostilities or unrest; now, of course, the term is 
most commonly used to describe spousal abuse.  Thus, in our current 
language practices it has become ambiguous.  Evolutionary ambiguities of 
this sort do not present much of a problem in language generally, or in our 
constitutional practice.  They are generally resolved without much contest 
or controversy by looking to broadly shared historical practices and 
contexts, and it is not worth spending more time on them here. 
 
 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW, 130, 156 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, 
eds., 2011).  I, however, intend the “incidental” label to include both this circumstance and those where 
the text, on its face, is unintentionally indeterminate. 
72
 See SOLUM, supra note 9, at 102 (bracketing “irreducible” ambiguity). 
73 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  For an interesting discussion of this example, see e.g. Mark S. Stein, 
The Domestic Violence Clause in “New Originalist” Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 129 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
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 Contemporary ambiguities, however, present a more difficult case of 
indeterminacy.  This type of ambiguity occurs when contemporaneous 
language conventions allow us to use the same term to make at least two 
different references. In such a circumstance, the term’s meaning is 
potentially indeterminate at the moment it is uttered.  One of Wittgenstein’s 
favorite drawings—the “duck-rabbit”—provides a simple illustration.  
Though he usually used it for other purposes, 
the image captures the problem of 
contemporary ambiguity quite nicely.74  If 
one takes the animal to be facing left, then it 
depicts a duck.  If, however, one imagines 
that the creature is facing right, it becomes a 
rabbit.  Without further clues or instructions 
from the artist, the viewer is left to construct 
the drawing’s symbolic meaning on her 
own—either as a duck, a rabbit, or both.  In the constitutional context, the 
word “arms” (for shooting or hugging?) in the Second Amendment provides 
a comparable example.  There are several ways we might resolve this sort 
of ambiguity—contextual or pragmatic enrichment, authorial intentions, or 
popular opinion, among others—each of which are, of course, subject to 
construction and debate.  But this is just the beginning.  It is also important 
to understand how this relatively simple problem may become far more 
complex when contemporary ambiguities function within a nuanced 
network of contested language practices—within which a speaker might 
gain certain advantages by using terms ambiguously.75  This requires a 
correspondingly richer illustration, which brings us back to the world of 
cards. 
 Omaha Hi/Lo is a very popular poker game around the world.  Each 
player is dealt four “private” cards, which only she may see.  Five 
“communal” cards—which every player may use—are then dealt face down 
in the center of the table.  Betting continues in stages as the communal cards 
 
 
74 Wittgenstein most famously used the “duck-rabbit” as a way of illustrating the cognitive 
experience of “seeing as,” or perceiving an aspect of something that one had not seen before.  
INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, at 194e.  Would that he had lived to see the debate over the infamous 
“blue and black” or “white and gold” dress.  See Jonathan Mahler, The Dress That Melted the Internet, 
N.Y. TIMES, B1 (Feb. 28, 2015). 
75 If it turns out, for example, that the picture was meant to depict both a duck and a rabbit (which, 
in fact, seems likely) this becomes an intentional indeterminacy.  In that case, we would likely want to 
know why the artist was deliberately ambiguous—what purposes this might have served—and whether 
the indeterminacy formed part of a contested communicative practice.  These sorts of inquiries are likely 
unavailable within public meaning originalism. 
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are gradually revealed.  In the first stage, known as the “Pre-Flop,” the 
players evaluate the potential strength of their hands based solely on their 
private cards, and bet accordingly.  The dealer then turns over the first three 
communal cards—the “Flop”—and the players reassess and bet again.  
Another communal card, known as the “Turn” is revealed, followed by 
more betting.  After the final communal card—the “River”—is turned the 
players make their final bets, and the hands are revealed.  Each player must 
compose a five-card poker hand using both of their private cards and three 
of the communal cards.   
The object of the game is to have either the “high” hand or the “low” 
hand—which then split the pot—or, if you are really good, both.  To that 
end, each player may compose two separate hands from the available 
cards—one intended to compete for the high hand, and one for the low.  To 
qualify as a low hand, however, the five cards must include nothing higher 
than a seven, and if no such hands exist the high hand takes the entire pot.  
Sometimes, however, the same five-card hand can be both the high and the 
low hand, which is known as a “scoop.”  This is possible because straights 
and flushes count in high hands, but not in low hands.   
 The rules of Omaha Hi/Lo thus illustrate not only the basic problem of 
contemporary ambiguity—in which multiple cards have ambiguous 
contextual meanings—but also the complexities of contested contemporary 
ambiguities.   That is, a player can choose which ambiguous meaning to 
give a card, hand, or suit in order to best serve her interests in the context of 
a particular contest; and, in fact, she may choose to use both meanings 
within the same hand.  With this in mind, her opponent must produce a 
strategy that accounts for each of these potential meanings, at least 
inasmuch as they appear in the communal cards.  This adds significant 
complexity to contemporary ambiguity as a source of intentional 
indeterminacy.  The possibility of these sorts of motivated choices also leads 
us naturally into a discussion of incidental and intentional ambiguity.   
B. Incidental and Intentional Ambiguities 
There is little doubt that some ambiguous usages are unavoidable, or 
at the very least, unintentional.  For example, the fact that both players in a 
game of Omaha Hi/Lo might have completed the best possible low hand—
they might each have held the lowest cards in different suits76—is simply an 
 
 
76 Note that even this sentence produces a contemporary ambiguity with the phrase “of different 
suits”: Different from the other cards in the player’s hand, or different from the cards in her opponent’s 
hand?  A bit of contextual enrichment, however, suggests the latter meaning, as suits are of no 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss1/6
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incidental feature of the game’s rules.  In such a circumstance, the players 
split the low pot, but neither reaps a benefit from the ambiguous rules that 
recognize two possible “nut” low hands.   
Likewise, in a recent study of founding era translations of the 
Constitution, Christina Mulligan and her co-authors have identified several 
incidental contemporary ambiguities in the text.77  These translations—
made for distribution to the Dutch and German communities in 
Pennsylvania during the ratification debates—evince some notable 
ambiguities in the text’s original meaning.  For example, the meaning of the 
controverted verb “to regulate” in the Commerce Clause was rendered 
differently in the two languages: 
 
[The Dutch translator] chose a Dutch cognate of the English 
word.  In Dutch, ‘regulate’ or ‘reguleeren’ means subject to 
imposition of rules or control, or to supervise.  However, the 
German translator chose the verb ‘einrichten,’ a somewhat 
ambiguous term, which could mean any of: to establish something 
previously nonexistent, to furnish something existing, or to 
establish oneself somewhere.  (For comparison, the translator could 
have used the word ‘regulieren,’ which means to subject something 
to rules or to control, now commonly used in the European 
Union.)78 
 
While this particular ambiguity is highly relevant to the historical 
arguments made in NFIB v. Sebelius—which centered on whether the power 
to “regulate” commerce empowers Congress to bring about commercial 
activity79—there is little evidence that the differing translations demonstrate 
any intentional choice by the framers or ratifiers.80  Thus, at least based on 
the evidence we have, this sort of contemporary ambiguity is of the 
incidental variety.  That does not make it unproblematic, of course—it still 
requires constructive decision-making by an interpretive community (of the 
sort noted in the “duck-rabbit” discussion)—but it presents fewer, or at least 
 
 
consequence within an individual’s low hand. 
77 Mulligan et. al., supra note 47. 
78 Id at 25. 
79 NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
80 See Mulligan et. al, supra note 47, at 52-53 (“[S]emantic dissociation between the two 
translations can be understood as either an example of differing interpretations, or as the contingent 
result of the translation process as a more or less conscious and controlled activity that inevitably leads 
to differences and even errors.  The latter possibility might often be the case with these translators’ 
work.”). 
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different, complexities than would an intentional ambiguity. 
This brings us finally to the problem of intentional contemporary 
ambiguities, which are those utilized to promote their user’s ends within a 
particular contest.81  The ambiguous usages of cards that could contribute to 
either high or low hands in the Omaha Hi/Lo example demonstrate this 
phenomenon in the context of card game. The practice is certainly also a 
part of American constitutionalism, as illustrated in the earlier story about 
Senators Cruz and Feinstein about the proposed assault weapons ban.  The 
question, then, is why would the drafters be intentionally ambiguous?  What 
advantage might have been gained in our contested constitutional practice 
by intentionally using the term “the people” ambiguously?  The answer may 
be fairly straightforward.  Using “the people” to refer to both the larger and 
smaller groups of citizens had at least two purposes.  First, it continued the 
argumentative effort to legitimize the Constitution as the act of as broad a 
popular sovereign as possible, while functionally limiting political rights to 
a much smaller subset of the population.  Second, by using the aspirationally 
inclusive term, the language set up an enduring constitutional contest about 
which citizens should enjoy full membership in the American political 
project.   
The “people” like the Declaration of Independence’s “all men” of 
equal creation was very much like an Ace of Clubs in a hand of Omaha 
Hi/Lo.  It had both a “high” meaning—the aspirational appeal to universal 
equality before the law—and a “low” functional meaning, encompassing 
only an elite subset of citizens.82  Senator Cruz utilized the more inclusive 
modern meaning of “the people,” which has largely won the constitutional 
contest set up in the original text.  Perhaps ironically, he was able to make 
a non-originalist argument about constitutional meaning by taking 
advantage of the intentional contemporary textual ambiguity in the framers’ 
language.  
 Several types of ambiguity, then, make some contests over the text’s 
semantic and legal meaning inevitable.  The simplest of these contests might 
arise over incidental evolutionary ambiguities—such as “domestic 
violence”—which seem unlikely to provoke much actual debate.  Incidental 
contemporary ambiguities present more difficult problems, however, 
 
 
81 Some philosophical accounts suggest that ambiguities are almost never intentional.  See Marmor, 
supra note 70.  This may, then, be an example of a circumstance in which constitutional law differs from 
other kinds of communicative practices. 
82 For more on the Declaration’s “aspirational” and “functional” meanings, see Ian Bartrum, The 
Constitutional Canon As Argumentative Metonymy, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 327 (2009).  The 
same sort of aspirational ambiguity exists in the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal protection 
to “any person.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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2017]      WITTGENSTEIN’S POKER: CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONALISM           51 
 
 
 
 
particularly for historical arguments that make claims based solely on 
original public meanings.   Whether the German translation of ‘to regulate’ 
as ‘einrichten’ is evidence of a broader public meaning than some modern 
interpreters have supposed, for example, is certainly ground for a fairly 
robust modern constitutional contest.  The most complex sources of 
ambiguous indeterminacy, however, are intentional contemporary 
ambiguities.  These are circumstances in which the text’s authors 
deliberately used language in ways that the relevant public would have 
found ambiguous.  Such usages purposefully establish the grounds for 
future debate and disputation, and confirm that constitutional meaning—
even within the confines of a severely limited interpretive practice—must 
remain the product of an ongoing practical contest.  
C. Incidental Vagueness 
Vagueness is a different type of indeterminacy than ambiguity.  An 
ambiguous term may be used to make at least two different references, but 
the referents themselves are generally not indeterminate.  Thus, in Omaha 
Hi/Lo there is no confusion about what meaning attaches to the “highest” 
or “lowest” cards in the deck per the rules of the game; nor is there much 
historical debate about which groups of “people” held full political rights at 
the time of constitutional ratification.  Not so with a vague term, however, 
which occupies indeterminate space within the rules of the language game 
itself.  Consequently, in borderline cases a vague usage fails to identify a 
determinate referent, and so leaves the truth or falsity of a proposition open 
to interpretive contestation.  Thus, we might reasonably agree or disagree 
with the assertion that lethal injection is a “cruel” form of punishment.   
Most instances of intentional vagueness have both “contemporary” 
and “evolutionary” dimensions (“cruel punishment” was intentionally 
vague in 1789, and was likely intended to be vague within different 
parameters today), and these changing boundary lines are the focus of much 
debate.83  Intentional vagueness is not, however, the focus of this paper, as 
I hope instead to draw attention to problems of incidental vagueness.  
Incidental vagueness, like incidental ambiguity, reflects the practical limits 
of contested language and the drafting process.  A more precise term—one 
that invokes more specific linguistic rules—may be unavailable, or the 
drafters may be unable to agree on more exacting language.  I will call this 
a case of incidental contemporary vagueness.  Alternatively, the drafters 
 
 
83 See Marmor, supra note 67. 
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may not recognize the potential vagueness in a term they choose to employ.  
I will call this incidental evolutionary vagueness, though we might also call 
it “latent” vagueness in keeping with some of the literature on ambiguity.84  
This latter form of vagueness, in particular, deserves considerably more 
attention. 
Another Wittgenstein-based example illustrates the problem with a 
question: “How many pieces of wood are in a broom?”85  The answer that 
springs immediately to most minds is “one”—there is just the wooden 
handle.  But there is actually a latent vagueness here; the answer depends 
upon what you think constitutes a “piece of wood” and/or a “broom,” which 
in turn depends on how you want to use the wood or the broom.  If you need 
two shorter pieces of wood, you could, of course, break the handle in half.  
If you need 100 toothpicks, you might find a way to reduce the handle to 
splinters.  Apparently, prison inmates sometimes deconstruct broom 
handles and turn them into zip guns.86  If you just need a broom, or if you 
simply think a “broom” consists of a wooden handle of a certain length and 
its attached bristles, then you are probably back to the answer “one.”  The 
larger point is that we may not see the potential vagueness in a term until a 
practical problem arises (such as the need for toothpicks) that draws out the 
underlying indeterminacy. 
 Another poker example may be helpful.  Imagine you are watching a 
game of Five Card Draw on television.  There are three players, and each 
has already exercised their option to draw new cards.  The television 
broadcast allows you to see all three hands:  Player 1’s highest hand is a pair 
of 5’s; Player 2 has three Jacks; and Player 3 has three Aces.  Imagine that, 
at that moment, you are asked which player has the “worst” hand.  Most 
people would likely answer, reflexively, that Player 1’s pair of 5’s is worst.  
But, again, there is a potential vagueness here, which arises out of the 
practical problems that contested betting strategies bring into the game.  
Player 1, knowing her lowly 5’s are unlikely to win, is likely to fold her 
hand without risking any further money.  Player 2, on the other hand, 
probably feels pretty good about his three Jacks, and is likely to risk more 
 
 
84 In contract or estate law, for example, a “latent” ambiguity is one that may arise out of changed 
circumstances. For example, although a testator had only one nephew named Lester at the time her will 
was executed, two such nephews existed at her death.  In such a circumstance parol evidence may be 
admissible to resolve the ambiguity.  Extrinsic evidence, however, would not seem helpful to a case of 
latent vagueness. 
85 See INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 19, § 60 (discussing whether the word “broom” refers to all the 
constituent parts, or just the whole). 
86 BEV CHRISTENSEN & LAURA ZIELKE, GRAB THE DEVIL’S TAIL: CONFESSIONS OF A CONVICT 
TURNED POLICE INFORMANT 89 (2007). 
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money by increasing his bets against Player 3.  In the end, assuming Player 
3 stays in, Player 2 will lose that money.  One could certainly make a case, 
given these probabilities, that Player 2 actually has the “worst” hand at the 
moment you are asked to decide.87  How much lower would Player 2’s hand 
have to get before he, too, would fold and cut his losses early?  A pair of 
10’s?  A pair of 7’s?  At whatever point that is—and that, of course, is open 
to debate—most people would likely agree that Player 1’s hand has 
definitively become the “worst” of the three, for most people, the initial 
question contains an incidental or latent vagueness that future contestation 
may reveal. It is the question “Worst in what way?” that reveals the latent 
vagueness of “worst” hand. 
 Incidental evolutionary vagueness often occurs in the constitutional 
context as well.  As an example, we might consider the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”88  In particular, the use of the word “respecting” 
produces what is likely an incidental vagueness.  Justice Clarence Thomas 
has argued that the First Congress chose the word “respecting” because its 
intention was to prevent Congress from interfering with the existing 
religious establishments in the various states.89  In this sense, the word 
“respecting” means something like “affecting,” and the Establishment 
Clause was intended as a federalism provision reserving to the state 
governments the power to either establish or disestablish an official church.   
When the Court began to incorporate various provisions of the Bill of 
Rights against the states, however, the Clause’s federalism meaning had to 
evolve.  After all, it makes no sense for an incorporated Establishment 
Clause to deny the states the very power the original Clause had specifically 
reserved to them.  So “respecting” began to change from “affecting” into 
“effecting,” and the Clause came to prohibit the states not only from 
establishing a church, but also from taking certain steps in that direction.  
To wit, in the seminal Establishment case of the twentieth century—Lemon 
v. Kurtzman—Chief Justice Burger could claim that, “[a] given law might 
not establish a church but nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end in the 
sense of being a step that could lead to such establishment and hence offend 
 
 
87 I must thank my colleague Peter Bayer for this example. 
88 U.S. CONST. amend, I. 
89 E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 36-39 (1998)).  Where 
Justice Thomas seems to part company with Amar, however, is when the latter recasts the Establishment 
Clause’s “reconstructed” meaning following the Civil War.  For Amar, an intense constitutional contest 
had dramatically reshaped the Clause, so that it came to guarantee an individual and not a state right.  
AMAR, supra at 249-54. 
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the First Amendment.”90  Exactly which steps might “respect” an 
Establishment end, of course, remains open to interpretive debate.  The 
ongoing contest over the Establishment Clause’s meaning, then, has brought 
to the surface a textual vagueness that the First Congress likely did not 
anticipate. 
 Two cases of incidental evolutionary vagueness were also at the center 
of the Court’s recent decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning, which challenged 
the constitutionality of several executive appointments to the National 
Labor Relations Board.91  The text in question was the President’s Article 
II authority to make unilateral appointments to fill “vacancies that may 
happen during the recess of the Senate.”92  When the Senate took its 
customary holiday break in December of 2011, Republicans were wary that 
the President might try to push through several appointments upon which 
the Senate had refused to act.93  With this in mind, they passed a resolution 
“providing for a series of pro forma sessions, with no business transacted, 
every Tuesday and Friday through January 20, 2012,” so that a formal recess 
would not occur.94  The President made the appointments anyway, and the 
Court was asked to decide whether the word “recess” included customary 
intra-session breaks (like Christmas), or just the formal break between 
sessions of Congress.95  Further, the challengers argued that the phrase 
“vacancies that may happen” referred only to positions that become open 
while the Senate is in recess, not to those that opened up before the break 
began.96  The Court decided in the President’s favor on both questions, but 
nonetheless concluded that the pro forma sessions kept the Senate from 
going into intra-session recess over the holiday.97 
 Again, there is no evidence that the framers were intentionally vague 
in adopting the recess appointments language,98 but a potentially unforeseen 
use of this Executive power arose fairly quickly within the politics of 
contested constitutionalism.  Thomas Jefferson, as the first overtly “party” 
 
 
90 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)(emphasis added). 
91NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 2550, 2556 (2014).  As noted above, the Court 
itself refers to these indeterminacies as “ambiguous,” Id. at 2561, but according to the stipulated 
definitions common in the literature, they are actually cases of vagueness.  To wit, there is no question 
about the sorts of things a “recess” or a “vacancy” are, rather the question is whether the relevant 
phenomena are cases of “recess” or “vacancy.” 
92 Id. at 2556. 
93 Id. at 2557. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 681-82 (1898). 
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President, “managed to appoint 120 officers during a single Senate recess, 
including 30 judges in the newly created courts for the District of 
Columbia.”99  And a century later Theodore Roosevelt would elevate the 
recess appointment to an art form when he appointed 168 officers—some 
very unpopular among Southern Senators—during the “split second” 
between two consecutive legislative sessions.100  Over the past half century, 
as judicial confirmations have become more politicized and the Senate has 
become increasingly intransigent, the recess appointment power has 
become a standard tool in the Executive kit—reaching a high water mark in 
the 1980s, which saw Ronald Reagan make 243 recess appointments.101  But 
the Senate has since pushed back by holding pro forma sessions to prevent 
recess, and some presidents responded by using three-day weekends to push 
through controversial appointees.   Thus, changes in our constitutional 
forms of life have made us revisit constitutional language and have revealed 
a latent vagueness in the original text. 
 Like ambiguity, then, the existence of several types of vagueness 
entails that the text’s semantic meaning must sometimes arise out of 
constructive contestation.  Some of this vagueness is undoubtedly a product 
of intentionally indeterminate usages on the part of the constitutional 
speakers.  This sort of vagueness is the source of a great deal of modern 
contestation, and even the New Originalists (necessarily) concede that such 
cases are not particularly susceptible to empirical semantic constraints.  
Less discussed, however, are cases of incidental or latent vagueness, which 
occur either when the speakers could not agree on a more precise term, or 
when emergent constitutional problems reveal unforeseen textual 
vagueness.  I suggest that this last type of vagueness is particularly 
undertheorized, even though it is significant source of constitutional 
controversy.  When considered alongside the problems of ambiguity 
discussed above, these issues of vagueness demonstrate that there are 
number of significant cases in which the text cannot provide an empirical 
constraint on constitutional meaning. 
D.   The Limits of Public Meaning Originalism 
I suggest that the thought experiment of a constitutional practice 
limited to the historical and textual interpretive modalities helps to 
 
 
99 Jeff VanDam, The Kill Switch: The New Battle Over Presidential Recess Appointments, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 361, 370 (2012). 
100 Id. at 371. 
101 Id.  
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demonstrate that the text’s semantic meaning must often arise from 
constructive contestation. The table below helps to emphasize the scope and 
importance of the limitations that these indeterminacies entail for public 
meaning originalism.  Upon examination, of the seven types of 
indeterminacy indicated, only the two types of incidental ambiguity would 
seem to benefit much from analysis of original public meaning—and even 
these, only contingently so. 
 
 
 
Public meaning originalism, particularly Larry Solum’s work, has 
done much to analyze and clarify the difference between ambiguity and 
vagueness in constitutional explication, but the problems of intentional 
contemporary ambiguity and incidental vagueness suggest that these 
advances may have come at the cost of constructive constraint. According 
to the New Originalists, ambiguity is generally encountered in the 
“interpretation” phase of explication, where it is usually overcome as an 
empirical matter.102  This may be generally true of evolutionary ambiguities 
(“domestic violence”), which often require only straightforward recourse to 
broad convergences in historical language practices.  It might also be true—
perhaps contingently—of incidental contemporary ambiguities (Dutch and 
German translations of “to regulate”), when there is enough uncontroversial 
contextual evidence available to make resort to authorial intentions 
unnecessary—though even this would require constructive translation.  It is 
difficult to see, however, how it could be true of intentional contemporary 
ambiguities, which were used to further their authors’ ends in a particular 
 
 
102 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2015); see also Solum, supra note 9, at n. 25. 
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political contest.  These sorts of ambiguities—being, after all, intentional—
would seem to require constructive recourse to drafters’ intent, and a good 
deal more construction regarding the relevant historical contest.103  This 
hardly seems to be the sort of communicative content we might hope to 
establish as a matter of linguistic fact. 
In the case of intentional vagueness, it may be that the distinction 
between contemporary and evolutionary indeterminacy is not particularly 
helpful.  In such circumstances, the communicative parameters of a 
controverted term may be fuzzy along shifting fault lines, but the basic 
interpretive problems remain the same.  The role that historical practices 
might play in guiding our construction of vague terms, however, would 
seem to be quite different depending on whether we are dealing with 
intentional or incidental phenomena.  On the one hand, the potential scope 
of intentional vagueness may be constrained or delimited by broad 
convergences in historical legal or linguistic conventions.  We might, for 
example, derive some constructive guidance from “paradigm cases” or 
“expected applications”; and (if we are willing to go beyond public 
meanings) we might even eliminate some meanings as plainly 
unintended.104  Incidental vagueness, however, seems much less susceptible 
to historical guidance or constraint, at least in the two forms described 
above.  First, if the authors used a vague term because they could not agree 
on a more precise term, or because none was available, the best we might 
hope to accomplish historically (and, again, only if we are willing to resort 
to intentionalism) is to divine something about the scope of their 
disagreement.  Otherwise, the history is just as indeterminate as the text.  
Second, if an unforeseen vagueness arises over the course of time, as our 
world and constitutional problems change, it is difficult to see what insight 
the ratifying history might provide.  This sort of incidental vagueness—like 
a Kuhnian paradigm shift—is simply a product of our evolving forms of 
life, on which historical language practices can provide very little, if any, 
useful guidance. 
CONCLUSION 
 The last two decades have seen an explosion in scholarship exploring 
the intersection between linguistic indeterminacy (usually vagueness), as 
 
 
103 This move, of course, is unavailable to public meaning originalists.   
104 On “paradigm cases,” see JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Harvard Univ. Press, 2005). On “expected applications,” see e.g., 
Michael McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). 
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analyzed within the philosophy of language, and legal interpretive theory.105  
I have suggested that such indeterminacies are an inevitable, and even 
valuable, part of contested language games, which exploit linguistic 
uncertainty to further different communicative or political ends.  I have 
further suggested that two particular types of constitutional 
indeterminacy—intentional contemporary ambiguity and incidental 
evolutionary vagueness—present substantial problems for public meaning 
theories of constitutional originalism.  Resolving an intentional ambiguity 
seems to require at least some recourse to authorial intentions—which are 
beyond the scope of public meaning originalism—and historical usages can 
offer little guidance when new constitutional problems reveal a latent 
textual vagueness.   
When combined with cases of intentional vagueness—which the 
New Originalists already concede to modern construction—these types of 
indeterminacy seriously undermine the practical value of public meaning 
originalism as an interpretive method.  Indeed, many—if not most—of our 
nontrivial constitutional disputes are contests over just these sorts of textual 
uncertainties.  In all of these cases, then, the public meaning originalist must 
either resort to intentionalist theories—with all of their well-known 
epistemological and jurisprudential problems106—or concede the question 
to modern judicial construction.  This, in turn, means that public meaning 
originalism’s claims about the existence of “empirical” constraints on our 
constructive practices can inform only a small, and relatively 
uncontroversial, set of actual constitutional controversies.107  In the end, 
however, this need not arouse the sorts of existential anxieties that beset the 
originalists of the 1980s,108 because the constitutional contest itself 
generates deeper and more enduring constraints on constitutional meaning 
than any posited theory ever could. 
 
 
 
 
 
105 See Marmor, supra note 67.  
106 See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 209-17 (1980) (discussing the difficulty of discovering intent, and the weakness of individual or 
institutional intent’s claim to legal authority). 
107  This does not, of course, mean that we cannot or should not be originalists; but it does mean 
that a robust conception of “original communicative content” may require recourse to original intentions, 
and so will not be “empirical” in the sense the New Originalists hope. 
108 See Edwin Meese, III, Speech Before the American Bar Association, Washington, D.C. (July 9, 
1985) (“A Constitution that is viewed as only what the judges say it is, is no longer a constitution in the 
true sense”), reprinted in ORIGINALISM: THE QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 53 (Steven G. 
Calabresi ed., 2007). 
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